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ABSTRACT 
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 According to Sewell’s principle of the multiplicity and the intersection 
of the structures, we consider here a retailing bank as an organization and as 
an institution. As an institution, the studied bank appears to be a 
constitutional democracy, whereas, as an organization, it proves to be a very 
efficient low cost company. Organizational and institutional features of this 
firm look correlated and this correlation is interpreted as an interaction 
between institution and organization, which takes place through the medium 
of interconnected practices inside the firm.  
 Institutional features are analyzed through Hauriou’s institutionalism 
and Turpin’s Constitutional laws theory, whereas organizational routines are 
described through a triadic model (Ostensive aspect, performance and 
artifacts) proposed by Pentland and Feldman. 
 Through the study of induction practice and interactions between this 
practice and other ones inside the firm, we map systematically induction’s 
practising in the sense of Pesqueux and establish a dual influence of 
institution on organization. Firstly, there is a mainstream influence from 
constitutional law to organizational routines, through interconnection with 
an intermediate step called “institutional routines”. Secondly, there is a 
“coherence” effect, by which some peculiarities of several organizational 
routines reinforce each other in the day-to-day life of the firm. 
 Finally, we discuss the possibility of building a constitutional theory of 
the firm. We emphasize the structuring role of law and the specific influence 
of political constitutional law on the empowerment of employees, through the 
dialectic tension between law and other components of the institution. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
A – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Every firm may be described according to several overlapping 
dimensions: for example the organizational, institutional, political, professional or 
even biological ones. Every dimension itself may also have several definitions, in 
which the mutual extents of – for example - the organizational and the political 
one may be quite separate or on the contrary almost the same. The study of 
diverse dimensions of the same firm leads to describe diverse structures that 
coexist and interact within practices.  
Such a point of view can be related to the concept of the multiplicity and 
the intersection of the structures, defined by Sewell (SEWELL, 1992), and used 
by Martha Feldman (FELDMAN, 2003: 747). As the latter explains: “the 
multiplicity of structures refers to the observation that social systems „are based 
on practices that derive from many distinct structures‟ having „different logics and 
dynamics‟ (SEWELL, 1992: 16). Organizations, thus, have informal structures, 
hierarchical authority structures and temporal structures, just to name a few.”  
 
1 - Importance of the institutional dimension for the study of practices 
It is commonly admitted that organizational and political dimension of the 
firm determine major levers by which managers can exert a certain influence on 
practices inside the firm. Our case study led us to emphasize the importance of 
the institutional dimension, and of its interdependence with the organizational 
one. Let us consider that an organization has to do with “coordination of persons 
and things in order to exert determined functions
1
”, whereas an institution 
consists in a “normative complex
2
”, whose principal elements
3
 are “aims of a 
higher order”, “foundation by rules which have force of law (are valid for 
everyone)” and are characterized by a high stability.  
It is not unreasonable to consider practices as “stable patterns of action”, 
which could in certain sense be meant by “routines”, even if we don‟t pretend 
that practices are only routines or only the performative aspect of routines. Then 
it looks natural that, on one side, when the organizational point of view is 
relevant to study some practice, this practice can be correctly described as an 
organizational routine. On the other side if it proves that the institutional point of 
view is relevant to study some practice, then it may me correctly described as an 
institutional routine.  According to Sewell‟s principle quoted above, „Structures or 
structural complexes intersect and overlap‟ (SEWELL, 1992: 19 in FELDMAN, 
2003 : 747). In so far as organizational and institutional dimensions of the firm 
                                            
1
 VATTIMO 2002, p. 1188 
2
 VATTIM0 2002, p. 800,  
3
 PESQUEUX 2007, p. 17, 
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may intersect and overlap, practices are likely to be described both as 
organizational and institutional routines, but, as we could establish in our case 
study, one dimension frequently prevails over the other.  
 
2 - Theoretical framework for organizational routines 
Martha Feldman and Brian Pentland proposed a theoretical framework for 
organizational routines involved in a perpetual process of reproduction and self-
transformation (PENTLAND and FELDMAN, 2005). As explained by these 
authors, such a view about routines is coherent with a general paradigm 
explaining the dynamic equilibrium of social phenomena, as exposed for 
example by GIDDENS (1984) or BOURDIEU (1977, 1990). But the peculiarity of 
their framework consists in decomposing every practice into three aspects 
inspired by Latour‟s Action Network Theory (LATOUR, 1987): the ostensive, the 
performative and the artifacts. The ostensive aspect of the routine is its “abstract 
pattern”; it consists in the pattern by which people bring the practice to mind. The 
performative aspect of the routine consists in the specific actions people actually 
perform. The artifacts are material products related to the practice like flow 
charts, Standard Operation Procedures, etc.  The generative properties of 
routines emerge from two dynamics: an endogenous dynamic produced by the 
tensions which come out between the ostensive aspect, the performative aspect, 
and the artifact of the practice. An exogenous dynamic produced by the 
interaction of the practice with other ones. As exposed by Martha Feldman 
(FELDMAN, 2003), organizational routines can influence each other through one 
of the three aspects, for example the performative one. We used this framework 
to describe the organizational dimension of practices and interaction between 
practices, and to confront our observations with some conjectures and results of 
Pentland and Feldman. 
3 - Theoretical framework for institutional routines 
As exposed by Yvon Pesqueux (PESQUEUX, 2007), many theories of 
institution are at disposal, but most of them are not able to integrate the 
dimension of conflict, whose importance is crucial in our case study. Maurice 
Hauriou‟s “theory of the institution and the foundation” (HAURIOU, 1925 ; 
HAURIOU, 1986) doesn‟t present this drawback. According to HAURIOU, 
conflicts are present in a very analogous way both in the spirit of every individual 
and inside the institution. This conflict has to be expressed and solved through 
“crisis of communion” by which all parts converge to consensus, some of them 
because they agree with the decision (the liber volui) , some other because they 
finally express loyalty to the institution and its aims (the coactus volui). The 
conflict solving design of Hauriou is procedural: the procedure is called 
“deliberation” and presents strong analogies with Habermas‟ “discussion” 
(HABERMAS, 1997). 
There is a second reason for choosing Hauriou‟s institutionalism when 
analyzing our case. According to Pesqueux, “Hauriou‟s theory is particularly 
appropriate to explain “the institutionalization of such movements like mutualism 
and public health care in France, at the end of the XIXth Century” (PESQUEUX, 
Institution/Organization/Practices 5/26 
2007 : p. 20). In fact the studied firm – the Crédit Mutuel - is a “mutualist” 
institution and the history of its institutional construction is fully in accordance 
with Hauriou‟s theory, as will be explained below (part I). Moreover, Hauriou 
explains why and how an institution must be considered as a legitimate source of 
law, through “dialectic tension between the state and other social corps” 
(PESQUEUX 2007, p. 20). This is particularly relevant for our study, because of 
the existence of an “internal law” produced inside the Crédit Mutuel, exerting a 
major influence on the practices performed inside the firm. 
Naturally Hauriou, as a French law professor who died in 1929, never 
used the term “institutional routine”. We propose to define the term as following: 
an institutional routine is a routine whose characteristics are directly determined 
by the constituents of the institution inside which it is performed.  
Hauriou stated the thesis that there is a natural trend inside every 
institution, that he calls “interiorization”, which means that more and more people 
interiorize more and more a common idea of work in their spirit. When a certain 
degree of interiorization is reached, the institution has come to the stage of 
“personification”. At this stage the institution has produced a set of “rules of law”, 
“statutes” and “higher principles of law”. 
According to our definition, routines by which the day-to-day life of the 
institution is performed (like tactics of deliberating in an assembly) can be 
considered as institutional routines. As exposed above, many routines in the firm 
present both an organizational and an institutional aspect. Our definition allows 
us to consider some practices, whose features are a direct consequence of the 
institutional peculiarities of the firm, as institutional routines, interacting with 
“more organizational” routines and influencing them.  
 
4 -  Practices as a medium of interaction between institution and 
organization. 
  
With such definitions, institutional and organizational routines have many 
characteristics in common. As involving “multiple actors and interdependent 
actions” (PENTLAND and FELDMAN, 2005: 795), they can be distinguished 
from individual routines. Indeed, particularly in the case of highly interiorized 
institutions, institutional routines must definitively produce “repetitive, 
recognizable patterns of interdependent actions, carried out by multiple actors” 
(PENTLAND and FELDMAN, 2003: 795).  
Pentland and Feldman consider that “identifying a particular routine is a 
bit like trying to isolate the Gulf Stream from the Atlantic Ocean” (PENTLAND 
and FELDMAN, 2005: 798). What organizational and institutional routines have 
then in common is an ocean of actions, representations and artifacts by which 
they take place inside human collectivities. This complex set, crossed by many 
simultaneous streams, can be considered as the medium of interaction between 
organizational and institutional routines. 
Why are practices so important for this mediation? As Pentland and 
Feldman explain “practice is inherently improvisatory” but “improvisation involves 
listening to what others are playing” (PENTLAND and FELDMAN, 2005: 796). 
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From our point of view, improvisation also involves inspiration from scores that 
the other ones have in mind if they belong to the same community. Pesqueux 
(PESQUEUX, 2007) calls “practising” this semi-deterministic (as well as semi-
stochastic) phenomenon, located at the interface between performative (the 
action) and ostensive (the score in mind). 
The moment of practising involves openness to other actions, other 
people, other practices, openness to reason but also to intuition and 
unconscious: it is the connecting node between many things, including several 
practices and, as such, institutional and organizational dimensions of the firm. 
  
B – RESEARCH  QUESTION, RESEARCH SETTINGS, METHODS AND MAP 
OF THE PAPER. 
 Is it possible to establish a relationship between institutional peculiarities 
of one firm and its efficiency? We studied the case of French retailing bank, the 
Crédit Mutuel Centre Est Europe (CMCEE), whose internal rights and statutes 
form a set of institutional peculiarities. Our challenge is thus to prove that these 
institutional features have an effect on this firm‟s management and efficiency, 
through the medium of several interacting practices. 
This study was conducted through a series of semi-directing interviews of 
employes and elected members of the CMCEE (Nine people, 30 hours), the 
direct observation of practices (10hours), the lecture of meetings minutes and 
the collection of internal documents describing the specific rights and statutes of 
the firm. 
The steps of our demonstration are the following :  
Firstly (part I of this paper), we describe some general data about the 
studied retailing bank, and stress its organizational and institutional peculiarities. 
Secondly (Part II of this paper), we briefly recall the idiosyncratic 
peculiarities of induction practice inside the CMCEE
4
 and explain that this 
peculiarities are perpetually created and recreated through the interaction with a 
set of interconnected practices, among which institutional routines transmit the 
influence of institution to organization. 
Thirdly (Part III of this paper), we discuss the possibility of proposing a 
theory of the political constitution of the firm, and emphasize the necessity of a 
political constitutional law inside the firm. 
                                            
4
 described in detail in another paper : JARDAT, 2006 
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II – INSTITUITIONAL FEATURES OF THE CREDIT MUTUEL 
A- GENERAL FIGURES AND FACTS 
The Crédit Mutuel Centre Est Europe (CMCEE) is part of the Crédit 
Mutuel, which is a major actor of retail banking in France (the second one in size 
after Crédit Agricole), and regularly expresses pride for its own Capital stocks 
(12,5 G€ in 2004), its growth and its profitability.  
On one side, the Crédit Mutuel is a classical retail bank involved in 
insurance and other peripheral financial service activities, with apparently 
classical management practices. But on the other side, the Credit Mutuel is also 
a paradoxical organization, which competes with corporations without really 
being one of them.  
This bank is a highly decentralized organization, with a rather strong local 
empowerment. The CMCEE is a Federation of 600 Caisses, each of them being 
a bank on its own, in charge of performing its own profit and monitoring its own 
prudential ratios.  
Some functional services and transversal activities are performed by 
federal entities. Inside the Crédit Mutuel, all these entities are called “The second 
degree”. Some of these entities are subsidiaries and provide various services to 
the Caisses :  asset management, technology, insurance products management, 
etc.  
 
 
B – THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION: A DEMOCRATIC FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
 
1°) A down-top legal architecture 
The Caisse is the “basic cell” of the CMCEE. Every Caisse is a juridical 
autonomous entitiy, whose legal status is called “cooperative association with 
variable capital”.  The Caisse is an association owned by its members and ruled 
by the legal status of the French association law, including the sovereign power 
of the general assembly, as well as the existence of a board of directors and a 
supervisory board. Every customer of the Caisse can become a member by 
buying shares.   
Each local Caisse owns shares of the “Federal Caisse”, so that this 
central bank is a subsidiary of the Federate. At the same time, the “second 
degree” federation with its central services is an association whose members are 
elected by the federate Caisses. 
The “Federative Bank” owns the various technical and financial service 
societies, but is itself owned by the federate Caisses.  
As we can see, from a legal point of view, the decentralized entities are 
the parent of the centralized ones, whereas, most of time in business, the central 
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rules and/or owns the local. That legal peculiarity is a first explanation for the 
peculiar organization of the bank. 
 
2°) A democracy principle, a dual power at every step 
The general assemblies at the Crédit Mutuel differ widely from the ones of 
a capitalistic society: the principal “one man, on vote” is fully respected, whatever 
the amount of shares every one is owner of.  
Besides, at every degree of the Federation, there is a co-management by 
the professional director and the board of elected members. The same principle 
of co-management is present at a more centralized level. Locally, several 
Caisses form together a cluster called “district”, inside which they can take some 
decisions in common. The elected boards of the Caisses elect the President of 
this “district”. This intermediate level corresponds to an intermediate level of the 
organization called the “regional services”, which are local parts of the 
Federation.  
At the very top federal level, we can localize the “General Director” of the 
Federation and his staff. The members of the central offices and committees are 
managed and recruited by the general director, who is himself chosen by the 
President of the Federation. This President is himself elected by the 
democratically elected instances of government, so that, through a cascade of 
political representations, every member of the central management is under 
control of the basic elected members. 
 
 
 
3°) A constitutional government for the firm 
The CMCEE has developed an unique institutional architecture which 
largely exceeds the traditional statutes derived from the cooperative associations 
law. The following elements exist only inside the CMCEE and nowhere else :  
There is a set of written rights and statutes, of purely internal value, that 
rule the decision making and the institutional relationships between the different 
parts of the federation. These rights and statutes are formulated in terms that are 
usually the ones of the constitutional law of a State. We can consider that they 
establish a sort of political constitutional law for the CMCEE. 
This written constitutional law is explicitly based on the “separation of 
powers”. These powers are in a number of three: an “executive power” exerted 
by the President, the federal board of directors and the general director chosen 
by the president, the “legislative” power of a “syndicate room” also called 
“parliament”, and the “judiciary” power of “arbitral jury”. Official documents 
describe a set of checks and balances between these three powers as well as 
rules for the election of people at each of these powers. 
The main institutional knot of The CMCEE is the “parliament”. Its 
members are elected, partly by the elected members of the Caisse Boards 
directly, partly by the Caisse Presidents and the District President, partly by the 
employees of the Caisses, regional Directions, federal departments and 
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subsidiaries, and partly by the trade unions. It is also specified that a couple of 
seats is reserved for local politicians. This “Parliament” is in charge of voting the 
“resolutions” (i.e. the decisions) submitted by the executive power. The syndicate 
Chamber plays a vital role in this government system. Every decision affecting 
the conditions of doing business for the Caisses, for example the price of cash in 
the internal market is submitted to its vote. Every strategic decision, for example 
the purchase of another bank like the CIC, must be voted by the parliament.  
 
The spirit of this constitution is expressed as the “subsidiarity” principle, 
designed to maintain the local power as strong as possible: “The nearest organ 
to the user should achieve all relevant tasks, leaving organs at an upper level 
(federations, co-ordinations, groups) perform the tasks is cannot itself sufficiently 
achieve. On the contrary, the federal organ should not achieve the tasks that an 
organ at lower level could achieve sufficiently
5
.” We can then understand that the 
decentralized management, on the organizational dimension, reflects fully the 
institutional principle of subsidiarity. 
 
 
                                            
5
 Internal document [DG,2], p. 3 
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C – DISCUSSION ABOUT THE INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE CMCEE 
 
 The CMCEE‟s institutional architecture and decision making illustrate 
Hauriou‟s institutionalism, due its anatomy
6
 as well as its physiology and its 
history.  
 
                                            
6
 Her we type in italic the terms that Hauriou used to describe the constituents of every institution 
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 The CMCEE‟s anatomy: the idea of enterprise is „to be a social bank” and 
is present since the creation of the first Caisses (Raiffeisen‟s movement). 
The organized power and the organs of the institution are highly 
elaborated, through a complete set of rights and statutes. The 
manifestations of communion are multiple : federate and federal  general 
assemblies, as welle as sessions of the syndicate chamber. 
 The CMCEE‟s physiology: the foundation of Caisses, as well as the 
periodical re-foundation of federal institutions and new statutes, follow 
Hauriou‟s principles, particularly the common will manifestations. 
Deliberations in assembly, decisions of the board and decisions of the 
director are part of the CMCEE‟s dayt-to-tay life. 
 The history : the CMCEE‟s degree of interiorization looks quite high : the 
central role of the organ of deliberating power  and the separation of 
powers, show that the institution has reached the stage of personification 
which, according to Hauriou (HAURIOU, 1986 : 110) allows a political 
liberty to take place inside the institution. This evolution towards 
personification  has lasted more than 100 years, and was punctuated by 
crises of communion. As forecast by Hauriou, the CMCEE, as a mature 
institution, has become an autonomous source of the law, producing its 
own rights, statutes, and even what we may call an internal constitutional 
law. 
 
 With such institutional features, being the ones of a representative 
democracy conducted by an idea of enterprise, one can expect that, from an 
organizational point of view, the CMCEE may be a participative organization with 
a quite high rate of empowerment, at least for decentralized middle managers 
(the Caisse directors). This empowerment may favor an organizational learning 
based on a “distributed intelligence”, allowing quite good adaptation to the 
customers‟ needs and evolution.  
 
But how do the institutional features of the CMCEE transmit their effects on the 
organizational life? A look at the practices that are performed inside this firm may 
give us some elements of answer. 
 
 
 
II – INTERACTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES WITH THE 
INSTITUTION: THE CASE OF INDUCTION 
 
It has been previously established (JARDAT, 2006; JARDAT, 2007) that 
induction inside the CMCEE is a low cost efficient process, especially if 
compared with induction inside another typically centralized bank. A description 
of induction practice through Feldman and Pentland‟s grid shows (i) concerning 
the ostensive aspect, a very homegenous and quite stable process, (ii) 
concerning the performative aspect, a great liberty for the federate Caisses, (iii) 
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concerning the artifact, the absence of any Standard Operating Procedure 
(SOP). Acccording to Feldman and Pentland (FELDMAN and PENTLAND, 
2005:799), this tends to prove that induction is a very interiorized practice, in a 
context of high empowerment of the working people. 
HR Federal department considers itself as a “service provider” for the 
Caisses, and that Caisses‟ directors are “the real HR directors of the CMCEE”. 
Moreover, it was explained that the current induction process was established 10 
years ago, through a change process that stressed consensus building with the 
federate managers. 
It is thus tempting to infer that such a situation is the product of the 
CMCEE‟s institutional features.  The consensus of the change may have 
produced an efficient induction process, due to the loyalty of the federate 
directors as well as the decentralized pattern of induction organization that came 
out of the negotiation between federate and federal. The search for consensus 
itself may be the compulsory consequence of a democratic constitutional law that 
would make every dictatorial practice implementation impossible for the federal. 
To summarize, the low cost decentralized induction process might reflect the 
“subsidiarity principle”, that is the “spirit” of the CMCEE‟s constitution. 
We are going to try to prove this by revealing the influence of the 
CMCEE‟s institution on its induction process, through the interaction among 
diverse practices inside this firm. 
A – INTERACTION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES 
There are some significant organizational routines that contribute to make 
induction practice interiorized and empowered. A first set of such routines is 
constituted by every functional service delivery from federal departments to 
Caisses (§1). These routines produce and reproduce the peculiar service ethos 
of federal departments. A second set of influent organizational routines can be 
identified through the more or less formal meetings that gather federate and 
federal employees, in order to deal with project management or diverse 
organizational problems (§2). These routines contribute to produce and 
reproduce an ethos of the search for consensus with federate managers. 
1 – The delivery of services by federal departments 
Although every Caisse is itself a bank, many functional activities are not 
performed by the Caisse but by federal departments. This has for consequence 
certain homogeneity of processes and products inside the CMCEE, as well as 
economies of scale.  
However, the relationships between Caisses and federal departments are 
all but hierarchic. As a Caisse managing director explains: “we are independent. 
For example, if we consider here that the new savings products proposed by the 
marketing are not convenient, we can decide not to sell them. If we are skeptical 
about the success of the product, we can delay its implementation and wait until 
other Caisses have used it.  If there are enough successes, then we adopt the 
product. No Caisse will ever be blamed by the federation for having this sort of 
attitude.” The same habits and behaviors occur concerning other functions: “We 
can purchase equipments ourselves if we prefer, as soon as there is 
Institution/Organization/Practices 13/26 
compatibility with the rest of the system”; “we can perform recruitment through 
the help of an external recruitment firm if we prefer”. 
Paradoxically, the recourse to external service providers instead of federal 
departments is very scarce. Caisse directors explain that they usually prefer 
services from the federal because they  offer  the best quality / price ratio, or 
because they  observe the success that other federate Caisse obtain thanks to 
these product and services.  
 
There is a whole set of service provision practices, related to several 
functions, by which a service-to-customer ethos is produced and reproduced. To 
maintain their legitimacy, federal departments have to design and perform 
efficient low cost services for Caisses, including service attitudes like openness 
to Caisses’ needs and concerns, which contribute to sediment day after day the 
idea that relationships between the federate an the federal are not hierarchy but 
partnership. The production and re-production of induction practice influences 
and is continuously influenced by the production and reproduction of other 
functional practices involving Caisses and federation.  
 
2 – Meetings with Caisses  
There is another set of relationships with Caisses in which the Federal 
tends to produce and reproduce a given ethos: project meetings, periodical 
inspection of the accounting system, and presentation of new projects or 
strategies. What these meetings have in common is a problem solving purpose. 
The way a solution is sought after is always the search for consensus. 
This search for consensus begins frequently with a quasi ritual that could 
be called “manifestation on contrition”. As several interviewed people explained, 
as well at the federate level as at the federal, the federal general director uses a 
very famous slogan: “in these meetings you [the federal] are here to be blamed 
[by the Caisses]”. 
Certainly, such a practice contributes to make other practices involving 
Caisses and federal department more consensual. Probably, there is a reciprocal 
influence between such ordinary life rituals and more punctual change 
processes, in so far as both are characterized by consensus building. This 
particular meeting ritual illustrates how many day-to-day practices contribute to 
reproduce values and related ways of performing diverse management practices. 
 
 
B – INTERACTION WITH INSTITUTIONAL ROUTINES 
 
Organizational changes occur in various fields inside the CMCEE. If one 
takes only one of these fields into account, major changes may look quite scarce 
: for example induction practice remained stable for the last ten years. But, if one 
considers the set of all the major changes that took place within the last 10 
years, it is possible to establish that: (i) a major change happens at least every 3-
4 years and lasts about the same time, so that the existence some major change 
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is permanent, (ii) all these changes have some characteristics in common so that 
they form a common pattern of change management and (iii) the CMCEE‟s 
institutions play a major role in these changes. Thus, we consider such patterns 
of action as institutional routines. 
The main pattern could be named “change from the top practice”. It is a 
very special way of initiating and favoring a change wanted by the federal level, 
and the establishment of new induction practice is part of this institutional 
routine.  
Every person who tries to explain the peculiarities of the CMCEE comes 
to tell a set of stories about some major changes which occurred within the last 
twenty years. The composition of this set may vary according to the interviewed 
person, but crosschecks show that none of these stories is an isolated memory. 
It is likely that these stories are widespread inside the CMCEE and are the 
ostensive aspect of a common culture of change. Each of these stories has its 
hero and gives a not ambiguous explanation of the reasons of success or failure. 
They can be considered as epopees in the sense of Alasdair MacIntyre 
(MACINTYRE, 1985), describing allegorically what are the main virtues that 
structure a cultural group. 
In the following, we are going to relate some of these reconstructed 
epopees, and then to analyze them in terms of change culture and virtues. 
 
Epopee 1 : The data processing epopee :  
“At the end of the 1970ies, the CMCEE had become quite late with 
the data processing. Whereas other banks had begun to automate some 
processes, through heavy investments in centralized data processing 
centres, nothing had happened inside the Crédit Mutuel yet.  
Indeed, the federate “Caisses” had refused such a mutation, because 
they feared loosing their autonomy if a part of their core business activity 
would then be processed inside a federal Department. The situation 
became more and more concerning when more and more complex 
banking products began to rise, like “Housing Saving Plans” for example, 
which couldn’t be properly processed by Caisses’ teams. 
But then came the hero. Michel Lucas (who is currently the general 
director of the federation), manager at the data processing department, 
proposed to bid on the further development of a new arising technology: 
the network data processing. He managed to convince every main 
federate and federal decision maker, so that a consensus eventually 
came through. Thanks to him, the modernization of the CMCEE could 
take place, and in spite of its late start, could be quite quickly 
implemented thanks to the loyalty of the Caisses obtained.” 
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Epopee 2 : The trade-unionist President epopee 
“During the “Trente Glorieuses”
7
, Crédit Mutuel was the only bank to 
pay attention to the low-and-middle class customers. Thanks to this 
proximity, the CMCEE  could achieve a very important growth when the 
salaries progressively were paid through bank accounts instead of being 
delivered in cash. This was the “bankarization”.  
But, despite this major growth, the federation could evolve with 
respect of the autonomy of the Caisses. The hero of this epopee is Theo 
Braun, the former President of the CMCEE until the eighties, who was a 
firm promoter of the “subsidiarity” principle, whereas other top managers 
were supposed to have been more “jacobinic”. Moreover, Braun was a 
former member of a trade union. He had the intelligence to understand 
the CMCEE dynamics, and to decide that one shouldn’t establish a too 
accurate organization chart for the Federation.  
This epopee is dramatically opposed to the history of the French 
competitors, which were nationalized in 1981 and had to experiment a 
very centralized and technocratic organization.” 
 
(Anti-) Epopee 3: The anti epopee of directors 
centralization 
“There was once a federal manager wanted to centralize more the 
CMCEE’s organization. In particular, he wanted to oblige systematically 
the Caisse directors to become employees of the federation, whereas 
the Caisses, through a local contract directly employed many of them. 
Before this attempt, the manager was promised to a brilliant future in the 
federation. But his project of centralization was firmly rejected by the 
syndicate chamber, so brutally that he could not keep his top 
management job and had to leave the federation.” 
 
 
Interpretation of these epopees:  
These stories illustrate that, at the CMCEE, the main virtue of a federal 
manager is the obstinate search for a consensus with federates. The failure of 
the anti-hero of epopee 3 demonstrates, and perpetually recalls when related 
inside the CMCEE, that Caisses (that is, their shareholders) are sovereign. Due 
to the constituted powers of the Caisses and the locally elected members, 
change actions from the top have to respect certain compulsory steps unless 
they are dramatically rejected. It is interesting to point out that these stories 
admit that the CMCEE presents some weaknesses, for example its inability to 
conduct brutal changes from the top. But at the same time, it is specified that the 
                                            
7
 In France, the so called “Trente Glorieuses” mean the 1945-1975 period. 
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hero transforms the weakness into a force: the efforts made to obtain a 
consensus guarantee a quite high efficiency of the implementation of the 
change, when finally approved. 
From an institutionnalistic point of view, these stories may be interpreted 
as crises of communion in the sense of Hauriou, by which conflict solving occurs 
through deliberation. 
The hero of each of these epopees has a very special counterpart: the 
CMCEE‟s rights and statutes. None of these stories would have been the same if 
constitutional checks and balances had not exerted strong constraints on the 
process. The constitutional law of the CMCEE shaped directly what happened in 
these stories. On even can say that this constitution was elaborated for this 
purpose. Change-from-the-top practice is above all an institutional routine. 
 
 
The consensual establishment of a new induction process ten years ago 
was not a contingent event, but an occurrence of the change-from-the-top 
institutional routine, directly derived from the CMCEE‟s constitutional law. The 
punctuated dynamic of change, as illustrated by induction practice, proves to be 
a major vector of the institution‟s influence on the organization. 
 
C – A DUAL INTERACTION BETWEEN INSTITUTION AND ORGANIZATION 
Induction practice is influenced by some organizational routines on the 
one hand and by institutional change routines on the other hand. Obviously this 
cannot be a complete and definitive description of interactions influencing 
induction. There is a bundle of multiple and diverse nets of influences among 
practices. 
In particular, it is likely that organizational routines influencing induction 
are themselves in connection – may it be direct or indirect - with institutional 
routines. How can one imagine that the „ritual of contrition‟ or the „service ethos‟ 
of federal departments have nothing to do with the federal constitution of the 
CMCEE? Establishing a not ambiguous relationship between institution and 
these organizational routines may require long supplementary inquiries in the 
field. Probably the circuits of influence, from routine to routine, are longer than 
the direct influence of change practices. But denying their existence does not 
seem reasonable. 
Thus, we can assume without too acute doubts that, having studied 
induction practice in particular, we have raised a global path of influence from 
institutional peculiarities of the CMCEE to its organizational features. The 
dynamic of influence is at least dual: there is a mainstream influence due to the 
punctuated dynamic of change, affecting most of the organizational routines.  
And there is a mutual influence of organizational routines that reinforce the 
specific values of the CMCEE, through a „coherence effect‟. Some organizational 
routines inherit the genome of consensus and empowerment from change 
routines that give birth to them, and then they exchange and reinforce this 
genome trough the day-to-day interaction with other organizational routines (see 
fig. 2 below). 
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Figure 2: the dual influence of institution on organization 
 
 
III – DISCUSSION: MAY WE BUILD A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
OF THE FIRM? 
 
Institutional features of the firm like the existence and characteristics of a 
constitutional law prove to have dual influence on practices, and then certain 
influence on its efficiency and prosperity. That is, through the medium of 
interconnected practices, there is a path from institution to corporate success. 
May we consider some institutional features as control parameters of the 
success of the firm?  
Probably the most admitted theory of the firm is the economic one. This 
theory considers the corporation as a transformer of capital into profit. As profit is 
returning partially into capital, there is a virtuous cycle of richness sustaining the 
growth of the firm. In this theory, the most important control parameter is an 
appropriate allocation of capital in order to produce the maximum of profit (see 
fig. 3). Another major theory of the firm could be called the “behavioral theory”. 
According to this theory, the firm is a transformer of individual objectives into 
decisions affecting the whole organization. There were some attempts to 
theorize the control of the firm‟s performance with this theory. For example, 
Ansoff (ANSOFF, 1970; JARDAT, 2005–II: 202-223) considered that decision 
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procedures could be appropriate control parameters of the decisions taken 
inside the firm (see fig. 4). None of these theories are today considered as totally 
false. In particular, managers are still trying to choose appropriate resource 
allocation inside the firm and to design appropriate decision-making procedures. 
Moreover, they purchase management books and management consultants for 
this purpose. Naturally, all these managers know, at least as an intuition, that 
these parameters are nor sufficient.  
As we admit the multiplicity and interconnection of structures, we don‟t 
seek for any reductionism considering the firm as only an institution. But, maybe, 
it would be interesting to raise a hidden dimension of the firm. Our aim could be 
to produce a theory considering the firm as a looped transformer of universes of 
virtues (for example: the search for federalist consensus) into practices. 
According to this theory, the parameters of control would consist in the political 
constitution inside the firm (see fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig.3: The economic theory of the firm 
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Fig. 4: The behavioral theory of the firm 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: The constitutional theory of the firm 
 
A preliminary step of the construction of the constitutional theory of the 
firm, is to establish the necessity of the law and of the constitutional law as 
generators of institutional routines, which is the most heretic part of the theory. 
Firstly, we must establish the structuring role of the law inside the firm-as-
an-institution (Paragraph A). Secondly, we have to explain why not only law as a 
social constitutional law, but law as a political constitutional law is vital if we want 
to really shape decision making inside the firm (Paragraph B). Thirdly, we recall 
that such a political constitutional law, as a part of the institutional anatomy of the 
firm, cannot be instituted with success independently from other aspects of the 
institutional “foundation” in the sense of Hauriou (Paragraph C). 
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A – THE STRUCTURING ROLE OF LAW INSIDE THE FIRM. 
 
The firm is an Ocean of instability with continents (perhaps only 
archipelagos) of stability. Not only performances have a dynamic dimension. 
Many apparent structures of the firm are in fact subject to quick change and 
instability, for example its rate of recruitment and turnover, its organizational cut 
into divisions, the main allocations of resources, etc.  These changes are part of 
the firm‟s life, and it may be particularly noxious to inhibit inappropriately its 
possibilities of move. 
However, law reigns over some fields of the firm‟s life, establishing limits 
that cannot be transgressed, independently from any management 
considerations that would motivate transgression. For example special laws may 
prevent the firm from lowering the salaries beyond certain limits, although this 
would have been a particularly appropriate solution for competition problems of 
the firm. And, in fact, firms respect the law much more frequently than diverse 
promises and commitments. It is obviously admitted that respecting the law is 
one of the most predictable aspects of people and firms behaviors. As Habermas 
explains (HABERMAS, 1997: 162), the general function of law consists in 
“stabilizing behavior expectations”. 
Thus, law may be a privileged control parameter in order to obtain 
behaviors that would not spontaneously take place inside the firm. In particular, 
law is frequently used to fight about phenomena of injustice that reflect the 
asymmetries of resources and power inside organizations: laws against sexual or 
moral harassment, social protection laws, etc. In general, we may assume that 
law would be a relevant instrument for the fight against organizational harmful 
problems that are caused by oligarchic phenomena.  
Firms publish more and more “charters” of transparency, of empowerment 
of employees, of social responsibility, etc. But these commitments have not force 
of law. They are subject to change due to strategic factors or even due to 
changes in the top management of the firm. The possibilities of recourse for 
broken commitments are weak, especially for players who don‟t master enough 
resources of information and power inside the firm. For example, may we really 
imagine that, without its set of precise laws and statutes, the CMCEE‟s 
organization wouldn‟t have been subject to the general trend of centralization 
that occurred inside French retail banks during the 1980ies? 
Hauriou thought that laws and statutes were the natural product of every  
“personified” institution (HAURIOU, 1986: 114-117), ensuring the continuity 
(durée) of the idea of work inside the institution. This must be particularly true in 
the case of any firm, like the CMCEE, whose aim (to be a “social bank” through 
the “self help”) stands agaients the current of social inequalities. 
 
B – THE ROLE OF A POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
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Law is an instrument. But not every sort of law is relevant to 
counterbalance harmful uses and abuses of power, particularly concerning 
organizational life. A typical example for this is the case of French banks during 
the 1980ies. Most of them were nationalized, and as a consequence they 
adopted very protective statute laws for employees, who were considered as 
state servants and, for example, could not be fired for economical purpose. 
Despite this legal situation, nationalized firms were very “jacobinic” centralized 
organization with no empowerment of the employees.  
This phenomenon is not really surprising, if we draw an analogy between 
law phenomena inside the firm and law phenomena inside the society. In his 
study about law and democracy, Habermas explains that (HABERMAS, 1997: 
93): “only laws of politic participation found the legal, reflexive and self-referential 
position of citizens. On the other hand, laws that warrant negative liberty and 
social rights may be granted in a paternalistic way. The state of law and the 
welfare state are in principle possible without democracy.” Transposed to the 
inside of the firm, such an analysis means that one must discriminate between 
“welfare firm” law on one side and “political” law on the other side. Thus, 
elements of welfare law, like social rights inside nationalized banks are not 
sufficient to influence the organization in the sense of the empowerment of 
employees. Only elements of political law inside the firm may do it. 
Within the sets of common or internal laws of the firm concerning powers, 
rights and participation we have then to distinguish between a social 
constitutional law on the one hand and a political constitutional law on the other 
hand. The social constitutional law exerts structuring influence on the way 
corporate decisions affect the stakeholders‟ welfare, whereas the political 
constitutional law shapes the ways and manners of taking into account the wills 
of power and participation of these stakeholders. Thus, only the latter may have 
a major effect on the legitimacy of organizational change process and 
subsequent practices. In our case study, the checks and balances that shape the 
features of the CMCCE‟s organizational routines belong to a political 
constitutional law and are part of its institutional identity, whereas the CMCEE‟s 
social constitutional law does not differ widely from the one of its competitors‟ 
8
. 
This confirms that only the former set of laws may explain the peculiarities of this 
firm‟s organizational routines. 
Legal control parameters of the generation of practices inside the firm are 
essentially to be found within a political constitutional law, even though there 
may exist interdependence between political and social rights. 
 
C – INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE FIRM. 
 
 
                                            
8
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Law “has no substance” and is pure “mediation” (OPPETIT, 1999: 24) or 
“dialectics between politics and ethics” (FREUND, 1965: 285). Political 
constitutional law of the firm must be understood as a vector of expression and a 
medium of reproduction of the institutional identity of this firm. 
As Maurice Hauriou explained “rules of law are not enough full of life to 
organize a community that would be proper to them and in which they would be 
expressed […] the true objective element of the law system is the institution”. 
Whereas law means only “ideas of limit”, individuals and institutions are “alive 
and creators”, produce “ideas of enterprise” and have “power of realization” 
(HAURIOU, 1986: 127-128). 
Political constitutional law must be understood itself as a vector of 
expression and continuity (through “stabilization effect”) of institutional features 
of the firm.  But it is a mandatory vector so that there is a generative loop 
between the existence and shape of law on the one hand and the properties of 
institution on the other hand (see fig. 6). This means that the former and the 
latter do not coincide permanently: there may be internal tensions between these 
constituents of institution. For example, the instauration of current federal 
constitutional law of the CMCEE was possible because of the moral authority of 
the President who proposed it to the syndicate chamber. This law was a vector 
of intensification and systematization of relationships and consolidation of 
common resources between federate members, and allowed to accelerate this 
trend. But it was possible to implement it because this trend towards 
intensification and systematization had already begun and because a majority of 
the CMCEE‟s members had interiorized the idea of this trend. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Dialectic tension between law and other components of the 
institution 
 
It may be unreasonable utopia to change radically the life of an aged firm 
only through instauration of a new political constitutional law. For example, the 
establishment of a democratic political constitutional law is probably not possible 
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if the firm has not reached a high degree of institutional “personification” in the 
sense of Hauriou. Considering political constitutional law as a control parameter 
of the firm looks easier if used as a grid of observation and deciphering of the 
firm‟s performance rather than as a management tool. However, such knowledge 
may be useful at some privileged moments, when firms have to change their 
statutes because of major organizational or business transformation. Then the 
art of “political constitutional law design” would rely on the ability to choose the 
appropriate degree of tension between institution and law, in order to implement 
viable change. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
There is nowadays a growing research community in France and 
continental Europe about the life of firms with untypical institutional architecture, 
the so-called “Coopératives” and “Mutuelles”. Although many of these firms exist 
since the end of the XIXth Century, their institutional and organizational 
peculiarities are not well known. Establishing some relationship between these 
peculiarities and the efficiency of these firms is a great challenge, not only for 
researcher but also for authorities, because many lobbies exert pressure to 
obtain their suppression or at least their transformation into classical firms. 
The general theory of interconnected practices may offer major access 
roads to the comparative assessment of several institutional types of firms, in 
relationship with their organization features and their efficiency. 
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